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NOTES
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRECLUSION IN ADEA FEDERAL
COURT SUITS-ANSWERING ELLIOT'S CALL
Responding to widespread concern for employment discrimination
against older workers,' Congress passed the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967 (ADEA).2 Rather than amending Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act3 to include a bar against age discrimination in
employment, Congress chose to enact ADEA as an independent statu-
tory scheme.4
Under ADEA, an individual may initiate a discrimination suit on his
own behalf.5 The private claimant must file his charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the EEOC).6 A federal court
will hear the claim upon the EEOC's decision to sue or issuance of a
1. See H.R. REP. No. 805. 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1967) (message of President Johnson);
L-ial Problems Affecting Older Americans: Hearings Before the Special Senate Comm. on Aging,
9 1st Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1970); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE Dis-
C-RIMIN.XTION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: RE-
S[EARCH MATERIALS 67-69 (1965) [hereinafter DEP'T OF LABOR REP.]; 'see also Note, Age
Dicrnmnation in Employment: The Problems of the Older Worker, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 384-88
(1966),
2. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, §§ 2-16, 81 Stat. 602, 602-08
(1967), codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-631 (1982). Congress designed pre-ADEA legislation primarily
to reduce older workers' inability to cope with technological advancement, rather than to eradicate
discrimination in the workplace. See 113 CONG. REC. 34,745 (1967) (remarks of Rep. Eilberg); id.
at 34,752 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer), Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimi-
nation Bills Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th
Cong, Ist Sess. 355. 461 (1967) [hereinafterADEA Hearings]. See also Manpower Development and
Training Act of 1q62, Pub. L. No. 87-415, 76 Stat. 23 (1962); Older Americans Act of 1965, 42
U S C §§ 3001-3055 (1982). Prior to enactment of ADEA, President Johnson issued an executive
order prohibiting age discrimination by government contractors. Exec. Order No. 11,141, 29 Fed.
Rcg 2,477 (1964). See also S. Ri-P. No. 723. 90th Cong.. 1st Sess. 13 (1967) (views of Senator
Javits). For a general discussion of the history of ADEA, see Note, The Age Discrimination in
Emplb4ymynt Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. Ri-v. 380 (1976).
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964. tit. VII. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66
(1964) [hereinafter Title VII] codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
4 Some congressmen believed that Congress should have extended Title VII to include age as
a protected classification. See. tg., ADEA Hearings, supra note 2, at 35 (statement by Sen. Murphy);
id at 29 (statement by Sen. Smather) In 1974, two bills, which later died in the House Education
and Labor Committee, were introduced to supplement Title VII by adding age as a protected classifi-
Laxtion See 120 CONG. Ri-C. 33,390 (1974); id at 35,661.
5 29 U.S.C § 626(c)(1) (1982).
6s 29 U.SC § 626(d). Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
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right-to-sue letter to the claimant. 7 Additionally, in states that have en-
acted laws prohibiting the discriminatory conduct, ADEA requires a fil-
ing with the appropriate state employment agency.8 There is no
requirement that the EEOC filing occur before the state filing. Thus, a
claimant may still initiate federal suit after a state agency has made fac-
tual findings and determined the merits of a claim.
Title VII similarly requires that individual claimants first file with
state employment agencies. In University of Tennessee v. Elliot,9 the
Supreme Court concluded that Congress intended to afford Title VII
assist civil rights claimants pursuing discrimination claims under Title VII. Title VII § 705(g), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g). Congress vested the EEOC with the power:
(1) to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agen-
cies, both public and privaite, and individuals;
(2) to pay to witnesses whose depositions are taken or who are summoned before the Cor-
mission or any of its agents the same witness and mileage fees as are paid to witnesses
in the courts of the United States;
(3) to furnish upon persons subject to this subchapter such technical assistance As they
may request to further their compliance with this subchapter or an order issued
thereunder;
(4) upon request of (i) any employer, whose employees or some of them, or (ii) any labor
organization, whose members or some of them, refuse or threaten to refuse to cooper-
ate in effectuating the provisions of this subchapter, to assist in such effectuation by
conciliatipn or such other remedial action as is provided by this subchapter;
(5) to make such technical studies as are appropriate to effectuate the purposes and poli-
cies of this subchapter and to make the results of such studies available to the public;
(6) to intervene in a civil action brought under section 2000e-5 of this title by an aggrieved
party against a respondent other than a government, governmental agency or political
subdivision.
Title VII § 705(g), 42 U.S.C § 2000e-4(g).
Under ADEA, the EEOC also has the power to investigate claims. 29 U.S.C. § 626(a). Like Title
VII, ADEA instructs the EEOC to attempt to eliminate the alleged discrimination before instituting
a civil action. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Both Title VII and ADEA dictate that the EEOC attempt to
effectuate voluntary compliance with the requirements of the respective chapters through concilia-
tion, conference and persuasion. Compare Title VII § 705(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(c)(2) with 29
U.S.C. § 626(e)(2). Only after the EEOC has failed in its attempt to mediate voluntary compliance
may it institute a civil suit oni the complainant's behalf.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), (c)(l). An individual may file a claim on his own behalf if the EEOC
decides not to pursue the claim. If the EEOC commences an action, however, the claimant's action
will then terminate. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). Section 633(b) provides that the EEOC may institute no action under
§ 626 until 60 days after the commencement of an action brought under state law. Thus, the EEOC
may not act until 60 days after a claimant has filed with the state administrative agency empowered
under state law to adjudicate age discrimination claims or the state administrative role is terminated,
whichever occurs first. For two interesting treatments of ADEA and claim preclusion, see generally
Note. State Deferral of Complaints Under the Age Discriination in Employment Act, 51 No'R E,
DAME L. Rtv. 492 (1976); Note, Procedural Prerequisites to Private Suit Under the Age Discrindua-
ion in Employment Act. 44 U. Cm. L. Rtiv. 457 (1977).
9. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/3
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claimants a trial de novo following state administrative proceedings.' 0
The Court accordingly held that unreviewed state agency determinations
do not preclude Title VII claims brought in federal court.' Whether
ADEA claims should receive similar treatment, however, remains
unsettled.
This Note analyzes an extension of the Elliot decision to ADEA
claims. Part I investigates the preclusive effect of state administrative
judgments under Title VII. Part II specifically examines the application
of Elliot to ADEA cases. Part III proposes a solution based on the legis-
lative history of ADEA and its connection with Title VII.
I. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE PRECLUSION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Title VII Background
Congress enacted Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to assure em-
ployees equal opportunity in employment by barring employment prac-
tices based on race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.t 2 Congress
granted state civil rights agencies a limited opportunity to resolve dis-
putes under state law.' 3 Primarily, Title VII created the Equal Employ-
10 Id. at 796; see also infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
I1 478 U.S. at 796. This Note does not address the preclusive effect of state judicial review of
state agency determinations in federal ADEA suits.
12 See Title VII §§ 701-716, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
13. Section 706(c) of Title VII provides that:
[i]n the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State... which has
a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing
or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to
institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge
may be filed under subsection (b) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expira-
tion of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law,
unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated ....
Title VII § 706(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1982). See also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526
n.5 (1972) (Congress intended to give states the chance to act on claims before the EEOC); 29 C.F.R.
S1601.13 (1981).
Thus. under Title VII, timely filing with the appropriate state agency is a precondition to an
effective federal filing. Mohasco Corp. v. Silver. 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1979) (federal filing not timely
until state deferral period expires): Citicorp Person-to-Person Fin. Corp. v. Brazell, 658 F.2d 232.
234-35 (4th Cir. 1981) (failure to defer to state agency renders federal filing invalid). Section 706(c),
honvever. only requires deferral by the EEOC when the particular state in which the alleged discrimi-
natorv practice occurred has both a law prohibiting the practice and a state agency authorized to
hui the dispute. The EEOC may commence its investigation only upon the expiration of 60 days or
upon termination of the state agency's proceedings. For a complete list of state deferral agencies
uindcj Titlc VII. see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1988).
Although generally a Title VII claimant must file with the EEOC within ISO days after the alleged
discrinnnatory employment practice. § 706(e) extends this period to 300 days when the person ag-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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ment Opportunity Commission1 4 to settle disputes through conference,
conciliation and persuasion before the aggrieved party may file a lawsuit
in federal court. Title VII empowers the EEOC to bring suit on behalf of
an alleged victim when conciliatory efforts fail.' 5 Title VII, however,
does not permit the EEOC to adjudicate claims.' 6 Rather, Congress
vested federal courts with the final responsibility for enforcement of Title
VII claims. 7
Under Title VII, the EEOC cannot pursue a claim until sixty days
after the claimant has filed a state-law claim with a state administrative
agency authorized to adjudicate such discrimination claims.', In states
without a law applicable to the alleged discrimination, the EEOC may
take action immediately.' 9 State agencies that adjudicate claims may
make both findings of fact and conclusions of law.a" The federal courts
traditionally have deferred to state administrative agencies acting in such
a judicial capacity.21 Moreover, section 706(b) of Title VII instructs the
EEOC to give "substantial weight" to state agency determinations in Ti-
tle VII complaints.22
Title VII entitles a private litigant to institute a lawsuit on his own
behalf so long as he has: 1) timely filed a charge of employment discrimi-
nation with the EEOC, and 2) received and acted upon a statutory notice
grieved has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local deferral agency. See Title VII
§ 706(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1982).
14. Id.
15. Id. Title VII provides that when the EEOC dismisses a charge as untrue, it must issue a
statutory right-to-sue letter 180 days after the charge was filed. Title VII § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(l). The complainant may then institute a civil action in his own behalf within 90 days
of receipt of the right-to-sue letter.
16. Title VII § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
17. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
18. Title VII § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
19. Id.
20. B. SCHWARTZ, AI)MINISTRATIviE LAW 9-15 (1984).
21. Id. See also Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 7
(1941) ("the distinguishing feature of an 'administrative agency' [is] the power to determine, either
by rule or by decision, private rights and obligations").
22. Congress mandated this standard in its 1972 amendment of Title VII. Prior to the amend-
ment, the EEOC was not required to give state agency factfinding any weight at all. Senator Ervin
explained that Congress designed the "substantial weight" provision to prevent the EEOC from
reversing administrative decisions "peremptorily." The Commission was thus required to "give due
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of the right to sue." Thus, a private litigant may bring a civil action
against an employer pursuant to Title VII if the EEOC chooses not to do
so. The Supreme Court has interpreted this "civil action" as a trial de
novo following federal or state administrative agency determinations.24
In 1972, Congress amended Title VII to bring federal employees
within the statute's scope.25 It added section 717(c), permitting federal
employees to file civil actions pursuant to section 706.26 Because section
706 provides for a trial de novo, it follows that federal employees are
entitled to a trial de novo in Title VII suits.
27
The enforcement provision of Title V11 28 fails to define precisely the
effect of state administrative findings on subsequent federal suits. Courts
developed the common-law doctrine of res judicata29 to avoid both repe-
titious litigation3" and inconsistent decisions,3 ' and to promote "the con-
23 Title VII § 706(b), (e), (f), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f). See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973).
24. Chandler v. Roudebush. 425 U.S. 840, 845-46 (1976).
25. Stv Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 11, 86 Stat. 103,
111-12 (1972) (adding § 717 to Title VII).
26, Title VII § 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982).
27 Chandler, 425 U.S. at 845-46 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
28 Title VII § 706, 42 U.S C. § 2000e-5 (1982).
2') Courts have used the phrase "'res judicata" to identify two types of preclusive effects. First,
I rue re, judicata, or claim preclusion, renders a court's judgment on a particular claim binding on all
other courts. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 100A (1983). Many
Lourt,, refer to this form of res judicata as "merger" because all related claims merge with a judg-
ment for the plaintiff. Additionally, because true res judicata prevents relitigation of a claim after a
judgment for the defendant, courts have characterized this preclusive effect as a "bar." Id. See, e.g.,
Ka'.par Wire Works v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535-36 (5th Cir. 1978). Under true
res judicata. a claim has preclusive effect if four requirements are satisfied: (1) the claim arises out of
the saim; cause of action, (2) as a claim for which there was a trial on the merits, (3) resulting in a
final judgment, and (4) upon which the identical parties, or their privies, litigated. See generally C.
WRiKii i. A. M11 I IR & E. CooPI-. FEi)ERAI PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND
RII \I I MA-i Lits (1981): Ri s I \ IrMi Ni (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982). Res judicata is a
niandatory doctrine Federated Dep't Stores v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401-02 (1981).
The second type of preclusive effect. collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitiga-
I on of a particular issue, To invoke collateral estoppel a party must establish that: (1) the issue was
,,ctuall5 litigated. (2) the issue N% as essential to a final decision, (3) the party sought to be barred, or
his pri%y, was a party to the first suit. and (4) the party sought to be barred had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue. Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897).
Issue preclusion applies to both factfindings and conclusions of law. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
CooPI R. supra, § 4425, at 245-46. Unlike true res judicata, collateral estoppel is a discretionary
doctrine Id. § 4420. For purpose% of clarity and consistency, this Note uses "res judicata-' to en-
compa,, both claim and issue preclusion.
30 Allen %, McCurry, 449 U.S 90, 94 (1980); Montana v. United States. 440 U.S. 147. 153
(l1)7 l'arklanc Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
31 When. 449 U.S. at 94, Montana. 440 U.S. at 154.
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clusive resolution of disputes within [the court's] jurisdiction. ' 32  The
United States Constitution3 3 and 28 U.S.C. section 1738" embody these
policy concerns, and require that federal courts give full faith and credit
to state court judgments. Based on the policy behind Title VII-assuring
parties the right to sue in federal court-it was unclear whether the full
faith and credit standard applied to Title VII claims."
B. University of Tennessee v. Elliot
1. Title VII Claims
In University of Tennessee v. Elliot ,36 the Supreme Court held that un-
reviewed state agency determinations of race discrimination claims have
no preclusive effect in federal court.37 Because the full faith and credit
32. Allen, 449 U.S. at 94. As the Court in Allen summarized, the application of res judicata
"relieve[s] parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and,
by preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage[s] reliance on adjudication." Id. (citing Montana,
440 U.S. at 153-54).
33. The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution provides: "Full faith and
credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the manner in which such Acts,
Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 provides in pertinent part:
[t]he records and judicial proceedings of any court of any such State, Territory or Posses-
sion ... shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and
its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State,
Territory, or Possession from which they are taken.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Federal courts have thus applied res judicata to state court judgments. See
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979);
Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1947).
35. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 173-83 (1961). The policy behind Title VII and the rest
of the Civil Rights Act conflicted with the notion that a state court could, under 28 U.S.C. § 1738,
preclude a party from later bringing its civil rights claim in federal court. See also Comment, The
Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Criminal Convictions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 95
(1975); Note, Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Section 1983-Res Judicata/Collateral Estoppel,
1974 Wis. L. REv. 1180 (1975). For further discussion of Title VII and res judicata, see Jackson,
Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79
Micui. L. REV. 1485 (1981); Note, The Role of Preclusion Rules in Title VII An Analysis of Con-
gressional Intent. 71 IowA L. REv. 1472 (1986); Note, Res Judicata, Collateral Estoppel, and Title
VII: Tool or Trap for the Univary, 62 NEn. L. REv. (1983).
36. 478 U.S. 788 (1986).
37. Id. In Elliot, an individual claimant, alleging racial discrimination under Title VII, re-
quested a state administrative hearing. Additionally, the plaintiff filed suit in federal court while
awaiting completion of the administrative hearings. Id. The administrative law judge found no
racial discrimination and the plaintiff then sought federal court review. The district court held that
the administrative law judge's ruling had preclusive effect, and granted defendants motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. The court of appeals reversed.
The court cited Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1981). for this proposition.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/3
1989] ADEA PRECLUSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE FACTFINDING 1137
clause applies only to state court judgments, its application to unre-
viewed state agency findings is inappropriate.3 a In the past, however, the
Court has applied federal common-law rules of preclusion to administra-
tive findings." 9 In Elliot, the Court specifically addressed whether "a
common law rule of preclusion would be consistent with Congress' intent
in enacting Title VII."'
The Elliot Court explained that the provision requiring the EEOC to
give substantial weight to state administrative decisions would be unnec-
essary if such decisions had preclusive effect. 4 The Court reasoned that,
had Congress intended preclusion to obtain in Title VII cases, it would
not have instructed the EEOC to accord "substantial weight" to state
agency findings.4 2 Rather, Congress would have required the EEOC to
defer completely to state administrative determinations. Thus, in Elliot
the Supreme Court chose not to fashion a federal common-law rule of
preclusion with respect to Title VII claims.4 3
Elliot. 478 U.S. at 793. In Kremer, the Court held that Congress did not intend a trial de novo to
follow state court decisions. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 485. The Court noted that, unless Title VII tacitly
repealed § 1738, state court judgments regarding Title VII claims have preclusive effect in subse-
quent federal suits. Id. at 468. Lacking an affirmative showing of congressional intent to partially
repeal § 1738 in Title VII suits, the Supreme Court in Kremer applied res judicata. Id. at 468-85.
Dictum in Kremer, however, suggests that unreviewed state agency determinations should have no
preclusi e effect in Title VII actions, even if a state's own courts would afford such effect. Id. at 470
11.7. For a discussion of Kremer and its progeny, see Preer, A Full and Fair Opportunity: A Perspec-
tiie on the Kremer Decision and It5 Progeny, 12 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 98 (1986).
3s. 478 U.S. at 794. As the Court explained. Title VII's legislative history indicates Congress'
intent to allow a petitioner to seek redress under both Title VII and appropriate state and federal
statutes. Id. See also Alexander %. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974) (Congress intended
that a claimant pursue Title VII and state remedies independently). The Court noted that the re-
spondent's failure to request judicial, rather than administrative, action had no bearing on the pre-
elusion issue.
3). Sce, e.g., Parklane HosierN Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories % University of Ill. Found.. 402 U.S. 313. 350 (1971); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v.
Bastci State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 378 (1940), Stoll v. Gottleib, 305 U.S. 165, 176-77, reh'g denied,
305 U S. 675 (1938), Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 291 (1906).
40 478 U.S at 796.
41 Id. Set, %upra note 22 and accompanying text.
42 478 U S. at 796.
43 The Court relied on the rationale of Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) in addi-
tion to Title VII's language. See upra note 24 and accompanying text. In Chandler, the Court
opined that Congress intended to afford federal employees a right to a trial de novo following federal
administrative proceedings. Chandler, 425 U.S. at 864. Although Elliot involved state administra-
five proceedings. the application of res judicata would represent a significant departure from the
Comu 's rationale in Chandler. Elliot. 478 U.S. at 795. The Court rejected the plaintiff's argument
that the presumption against an implied repeal of § 1738 dictates a finding of preclusion. According
Washington University Open Scholarship
1138 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:1131
2 Section 1983 Claims and the Utah Criteria
The Supreme Court in Elliot also addressed the question of whether
state administrative determinations have preclusive effect in subsequent
federal court suits under the Reconstruction Civil Rights Statute, 42
U.S.C. section 1983." Citing a prior Supreme Court decision,4" the
Court explained that, unlike Title VII, nothing in the language of section
1983 suggests that Congress intended to bar traditional notions of res
judicata.46 According to the Court, both the full faith and credit stan-
dard and common-law rules of preclusion apply to section 1983 suits.47
No legislative mandate partially repealing the statutory requirements of
the full faith and credit clause exists for section 1983 suits. 48 Moreover,
in enacting the Reconstruction Civil Rights Statutes, Congress did not
intend to foreclose application of res judicata to future civil procedural
developments-here, the modem use of administrative adjudication.49
Having found no congressional intent to bar preclusion, the Court next
reaffirmed and applied its prior holding in United States v. Utah Con-
struction and Mining Co.5" In Utah, the Court held that state adminis-
trative adjudications resolving "disputed issues of fact properly before
[the agency] which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to liti-
gate" have preclusive effect in subsequent state court suits.5' The Elliot
Court extended Utah to allow federal courts to apply this standard to
subsequently raised state agency determinations." According to the
to the Court, "[t]his argument is based on the erroneous premise that § 1738 applies to state admin-
istrative proceedings." Id. at 796.
44. Id. at 793. In Elliot, the petitioner brought a civil rights action under both Title VII of the
1964 Civil Rights Act and the Reconstruction civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme
Court in Elliot held that, while state agency Title VII adjudication does not have preclusive effect in
subsequent federal court suits, similar § 1983 actions do. Id. at 799.
45. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
46. 478 U.S. at 794. Moreover, the Court suggested that the decision in Allen was valid "even
in the absence of § 1738." Id. The Court thus asserted that Allen does not stand for the notion that





50. Id. at 797 (citing Utah, 384 U.S. 394 (1966)).
51. 384 U.S. at 421-22. The Utah Court further specified that the "parties have had anl ade.
quate opportunity to litigate" dispute issues of fact "properly" brought before the agency. Id.
52. Accordingly, the Court held that when a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity ...
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity
to litigate, federal courts must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it
would be entitled in the State's courts." Elliot, 478 U.S. at 799 (citation, footnote omitted).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss4/3
1989] ADEA PRECLUSION OF ADMINISTRATIVE FACTFINDING 1139
Court, the full faith and credit clause compels this conclusion53 because
the clause's purpose-to act as a nationally unifying force-applies
equally to state and federal courts.54
3. The Elliot Two-Pronged Test
In effect, the Elliot decision established a two-pronged test for deter-
mining the common-law preclusive effect of state agency decisions in fed-
eral courts. If Congress, through the language and legislative history of a
statute, intended to bar preclusive effect of state administrative findings
in federal court, then preclusion will not obtain.55 If Congress did not
intend such a result, then findings of a state agency acting in a judicial
capacity in a proceeding in which the litigants had a full and fair oppor-
tunity to argue their claims are entitled to preclusive effect. The resulting
presumption favoring preclusive effect stems from the general res judi-
cata principle of "enforcing repose."56
II. THE EFFECT OF ELLIOT ON ADEA ADMINISTRATIVE
PRECLUSION IN FEDERAL COURT
A. ADEA Background
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act virtually compelled age discrim-
ination legislation. Section 715 of the Civil Rights Act directed the Sec-
retary of Labor to study and report on the status of older workers in
employment.57 The Secretary explored nonstatutory means of curbing
53, Id. at 794-95. Whereas Elliot involved a potential federal court review of state agency
factfinding, Utah involved a potential state court review of state agency factfinding. The difference is
significant in that federal courts, unlike state courts, are not bound by the full faith and credit clause.
S ,, %upra note 34 and accompanying text.
54. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 795 The Court explained that, although § 1738 does not bind federal
courts, the policy behind the clause provides a good reference point from which to begin the inquiry.
Se' Nupra note 34 and accompanying text. Because § 1738's application to federal as well as state
courts achieves the goal of federal-state comity, the Supreme Court broadened the holding in Utah to
encompas' federal courts. Id.
55. The Court impliedly established this congressional exception in the context of both Title
VII ("[§ 1738] clearly does not represent a congressional determination that the decisions of state
administrative agencies should not be given preclusive effect." 478 U.S. 795) and § 1983 ("Congress
of course may decide, as it did in enacting Title VII, that other values outweigh the policy of accord-
ing finality to state administrative factfinding." Id. at 799 n.7).
56. Id. at 798.
57 Title VII § 715, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1982); see DEP'T. OF LABOR REP., supra note 1. The
Secretary's report discussed the pervasixeness of age discrimination in employment, but found "no
evidence of prejudice based on dislike or intolerance for the older worker." Id. Rather, the report
revealed that age discrimination stemmed from employers' mistaken beliefs that older workers are
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age discrimination in the workplace, but described this possibility as
"barren.""8 As a result, he recommended a federal statutory scheme to
"promote hiring without discrimination on the basis of age."59 Two
years later, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967.60
In 1974, Congress amended ADEA to bring federal employees within
the Statute's scope.6' Although the legislative history of the 1972 Title
VII amendments clearly indicates Congress' intent to provide federal em-
ployees with a trial de novo following administrative factfindings, 6 2
ADEA legislative history is silent on the matter.63 Both the Fourth and
the Ninth Circuits have suggested that, in amending ADEA, Congress
obviously found it unnecessary to reconsider issues previously resolved in
the Title VII amendment debates. 64 Under this view, the absence of
ADEA legislative history does not necessarily refute congressional intent
that ADEA and Title VII have identical preclusive effect.
Although ADEA and Title VII share the common goal of abating em-
ployment discrimination, 65 the statutes operate independently. Con-
gress, however, patterned many provisions in ADEA after Title VII.66
Indeed, the Supreme Court explicitly sanctioned analogy to Title VII as a
less competent than younger workers solely because of their age. 113 CONG. REc. 34,742 (1967)
(remarks of Rep. Bulke); id. at 34,752 (remarks of Rep. Dwyer); id. at 31,254 (remarks of Sen.
Javits); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on Age Discrimination Bills Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1967).
58. DEP'T. OF LABOR REP., supra note 1. By 1967, 24 states had already enacted age discrimi-
nation statutes comparable to ADEA. H.R. REP. No. 805, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The Man-
power Administration of the Department of Labor in May-June 1963 surveyed the effectiveness of
these state laws. Id. State officials as well surveyed the perceived advantages of a federal policy
condemning age discrimination in employment. Id.
59. DEP'T. OF LABOR REP., supra note 1.
60. See supra note 2.
61. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 55,
74-75 (1974) (adding § 633a to ADEA).
62. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 848 (1976).
63. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811 (legislative history of the 1974 amendment
to ADEA).
64. See Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237, 240 (4th Cir. 1985). Nabors v.
United States, 568 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir. 1978); infra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
65. Compare ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1982) with Title VII § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c (1982).
66. For example, the substantive and procedural provisions of Title VII and ADEA are similar.
Compare Title VII §§ 701, 703, 704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-2, 2000e-3 (1982) (Title VII substan-
tive provisions) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630 (1982) (ADEA substantive provisions); compare Title
VII §,706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1982) (Title VII enforcement provisions) with 29 U.S.C. §§ 211 (b),
216(b), 216(c), 217, 626(b) (1982) (ADEA enforcement provisions).
The deferral provision in ADEA, entitled "Federal-State relationship," reads in pertinent part:
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means of interpreting certain ADEA provisions, where the two statutes
use comparable language. In Oscar Mayer v. Evans,67 the Court held that
"since the language of [an ADEA provision] is almost in haec verba with
[an analogous Title VII provision] ... it may be properly concluded that
Congress intended that the construction of [the ADEA section] should
follow that of [the Title VII section]."68 Oscar Mayer indicates that in-
terpreting ADEA by analogy to Title VII is a valid method of analysis.
B. Federal Administrative Preclusion Under ADEA
Prior to Elliot, the Ninth Circuit in Nabors v. United States,6 9 relied on
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII's deferral provision, sec-
tion 717(c),7 ° to determine the extent of preclusion under the analogous
ADEA provision, section 633a(c).7 t The Nabors court recognized the
Supreme Court's finding that section 717(c) of Title VII allows federal
employees to enjoy a trial de novo rather than judicial review of federal
administrative factfinding. 72 Noting the judicial tendency to analogize
ADEA and Title VII provisions, 73 the Ninth Circuit broadened the Elliot
(a) Federal action superseding State action:
Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of any agency of any state performing
like functions with regard to discriminatory employment practices on account of age
except that upon commencement of action under this Act such action shall supersede
any State action.
(b) Limitation of federal action upon commencement of state proceedings:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a state which has a law
prohibiting discrimination in employment because of age and establishing or authoriz-
ing a state authority to grant or seek relief from such discriminatory practice, no suit
may be brought under section 7 of this Act [29 U.S.C. § 626] before the expiration of
sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless proceed-
ings have been earlier terminated ....
29 U.S C § 633(a), (b) (1982). See supra note 13 for Title VII's analogous deferral provision.
67 441 U.S. 750 (1979)
608 Id at 756 See also Northcross v. Board of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (Comparing
§ 718 of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 with § 204(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
69) 568 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978). Prior to judicial construction of 29 U.S.C. § 633, the Ninth
Circuit interpreted a similar provision, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) reads as follows:
"Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in any Federal district court of competent jurisdic-
tion for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C.
§ 633a(c) (1982).
70 Section 717(c) reads: "an employee or applicant for employment, if aggrieved by the final
disposition of his complaint, or by failure to take final action on his complaint, may lile a civil action
as provided in section 2000e-5 1706] of this title." Title VII § 717(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1982).
71 Compare Title VII § 717(c), § 2000e-16(c), supra note 70, with 29 U.S.C. § 633a(c) (1982)
(ADEA), supra note 69.
72. 568 F.2d at 659-60. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976). See supra notes 24,
43 and accompanying text.
73 The court noted that analogy to Title VII in defining ADEA provisions is a common judi-
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holding to embrace ADEA section 633a(c). The court reasoned that
similarities between the two provisions dictate similar civil actions. 74
The court therefore concluded that ADEA, like Title VII, entitles federal
employees to a trial de novo when a federal administrative body has
made a "final" decision on the merits.
The Fourth Circuit similarly extended the Elliot rationale to the con-
text of ADEA. In Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 76 the Fourth
Circuit recognized under ADEA a presumption against administrative
preclusion in unreviewed discrimination cases in subsequent federal
court suits.7 7 Because Congress entrusted resolution of discrimination
claims to the federal judiciary, the court reasoned that legislative policy
favors review in federal courts. 78  Citing Nabors, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that Title VII's bar of administrative preclusion applies "with
equal force under ADEA."79
C. State Administrative Preclusion Under ADEA
Since Elliot, the circuit courts have split with respect to whether state
administrative findings are entitled to preclusive effect in federal ADEA
cases.8" Although Elliot enunciated a test requiring initial deferral to
cial practice. The court cited United Air Lines v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 200 (1977); Dartt v. Shell
Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1259 (10th Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 434 U.S. 99 (1977),
reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1042 (1978); Curry v. Continental Airlines, 513 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir. 1975).
See also Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 525 F.2d 92, 94 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting the similarities of
Title VII and ADEA); Goger v. H.K. Porter Co., 492 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1974) (comparing Title
VII and ADEA provisions).
74. Nabors, 568 F.2d at 659.
75. Id.
76. 769 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 239.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 240.
80. The following courts have discussed the issue specifically: the Fourth Circuit, in Rosenfeld
v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1985); the Ninth Circuit, in Mack v. South Bay
Beer Distrib., 798 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1986); the Seventh Circuit, in Duggan v. Board of Educ., 818
F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1987); and the Eighth Circuit, in Stillians v. State of Iowa, 843 F.2d 276 (8th Cir.
1988). For a discussion of these cases see supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text, infra notes 87-
92, 98-132 and accompanying text.
Although only these four circuits have addressed this specific issue, at least three other circuits
have recognized the problem. In Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 815 F.2d 641, 646 47 (I Ith Cir.
1987) the court indicated in dictum that, under proper circumstances, it would follow the analysis in
Duggan. In Gjellum v. City of Birmingham, 829 F.2d 1056, 1070 (1 th Cir. 1987), the Eleventh
Circuit also held that the importance of federal rights requires that federal courts give no resjudicata
effect to unreviewed state agency decisions. The court, however, ruled that because the state agency
did not afford the appellants an adequate opportunity to litigate their claims, Elliot's effect was
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congressional intent, the Court necessarily limited its holding to Title
VII and section 1983 actions.8' Three of the five courts addressing the
administrative preclusion issue under ADEA chose not to consider Con-
gress' intent in enacting ADEA.s2 Rather, these courts simply applied
the second prong of the Elliot test.83 Of the two courts that actually
addressed congressional intent, only one interpreted the ADEA federal-
state relationship provision by analogy to Title VII's federal-state rela-
tionship provision. 4
1. Avoiding the Congressional Intent Step
In Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors,85 the Ninth Circuit, although
citing Elliot, refused to decide whether Congress intended to bar preclu-
sion under the ADEA. Avoiding the first prong of the Elliot test, the
court considered only the Utah criteria of the second prong.8 6 Because
the petitioner had no adequate opportunity to litigate his age discrimina-
tion claim, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the federal common-law
rule of claim preclusion. 7
In Delgado v. Lockheed-Georgia Co. , the Eleventh Circuit also found
it unnecessary to determine whether state administrative findings have
preclusive effect in federal court with respect to ADEA claims.89 While
the court found the EEOC persuasive in arguing Congress' preclusive
intent was similar for ADEA and Title VII suits,9" it nevertheless refused
to decide this point. Instead, the Delgado court resolved the case
through the second prong of the Elliot test.9 ' Because the state agency in
irrclevant S'. a ipra notes 44-54 and accompanying text. In Nichols v. City of St. Louis, 837 F.2d
833. ,35 (8th Cir. 1988). the court held that state court determinations can preclude Title VII claims
hiought in federal court.
NJ See \upra note 43 and accompanying text.
S2 Sec intra notes 86. 89, 94 and accompanying text.
83 Sec wupra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
84 Se, inlro notcs 119-23 Courts. howexer. have frequently construed analogous Title VII
and ADEA provisions similarly. See. e.g. Oscar Mayer v. Evans. 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979) (§ 14(b)
of ADEA patterned after § 706(c) of Title VII). See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
;5 798 F 2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1986)-
X , d. at 1283. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
87 798 F,2d at 1283-84
S8 ,15 F2d 641 (11th Cir 1987)
9 Itt at 646.
9) Id The court explained that the differences between the deferral mechanisms in ADEA
and Title VII 'uggest that Congress intended to appropriate less deference to state agency adjudica-
tions in ADEA claim, than in Title VII claims, Id.
1)1 d.
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question did not afford the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to litigate
their claims, the court refused to give the agency's finding preclusive
effect.92
The District Court for the Southern District of New York in Frank v.
Capital Cities Communications, Inc. 93 similarly saw no need to reach the
ADEA administrative preclusion question. In Frank, the district court
simply assumed, arguendo, that unreviewed state administrative determi-
nations are entitled to preclusive effect in federal court, and proceeded to
apply the Utah factors.94
The courts in Mack, Delgado and Frank avoided the first step of the
Elliot test. 'These courts reasoned that because the petitioners had no
real opportunity to litigate their claims before the appropriate adminis-
trative bodies, preclusion did not apply.95 Although this conclusion is
correct, the rationale should rest on Elliot's first prong. Whether a peti-
tioner has had an adequate opportunity to litigate a claim is irrelevant if
ADEA claims are not entitled to preclusion in the first place. Thus, the
more pressing question is not whether the Utah criteria are satisfied, but
rather whether Congress intended to bar the preclusive effect of unre-
viewed state agency determinations in federal court.96 Elliot teaches that
only upon reaching a negative answer to the congressional intent ques-
tion should a court apply the Utah standard.97
2. The Congressional Intent Inquiry
a. Stillians v. State of Iowa
The Eighth Circuit addressed the congressional intent issue in Stillians
92. Id. at 647. The Eleventh Circuit found it unnecessary to address the administrative adjudi-
cation issue because, unlike most states, Georgia had no state agency overseeing discrimination
claims. Id. at 646-47 n.8. See 29 U.S.C § 633(b). The court thus concluded that the plaintiffs were
provided no opportunity to litigate their claims. 815 F.2d at 647. Although Elliot involved a state
(Tennessee) that did have a state agency overseeing discrimination claims, Elliot's rationale is still
applicable in Delgado. Elliot's foundation rests not on the existence of a state agency, but rather on
the congressional intent of the specific statute in question (i.e., whether Congress intended ADEA to
supersede traditional notions of state administrative preclusion). See supra notes 40-43 accompany-
ing texts.
93. 689 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
94. Id. at 337. In Frank, the court stated that it need not even decide the administrative preclu-
sion issue if the facts of the case would not "sustain the bar." Id. The court merely assumed that
state agency factfinding in ADEA claims has res judicata effect in subsequent federal court suits.
95. See supra notes 87, 92 and accompanying text.
96. Elliot, 478 U.S. at 791. See also supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
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v. State of Iowa.9 Purporting to apply the Elliot test, the court first cor-
rectly asked whether ADEA manifests congressional intent to bar pre-
clusion of state administrative findings in subsequent federal court
suits. " The court answered the question in the negative, reasoning that
ADEA must clearly and independently exhibit congressional intent to
bar administrative preclusion in federal court.'00
The court noted that when a statute infringes on the common law, a
presumption exists favoring common-law principles' unless Congress
clearly intends otherwise.'0 2 Because the common-law doctrine of res
judicata was firmly established when Congress enacted ADEA, 10 3 the
Stillians court upheld the presumption favoring preclusion."14
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit declined to interpret ADEA by anal-
ogy to Title VII.t °5 The court reasoned that a reviewing court must ana-
lyze a statute independently for expressions of congressional intent.'t 6 If
Congress intended ADEA decisions to have the same preclusive charac-
ter as Title VII decisions, ADEA's language would specifically reflect
such an intent.'0 7 In searching for congressional intent,'0 8 the Eighth
98 843 F.2d 276 (8th Cir. 1988).
99 Id. at 280-83. The Eighth Circuit, although affirming the district court's judgment, em-
ploy ed a different analysis. The district court held that res judicata precluded Stillians from raising
her claims in federal court because she could have raised one of her claims before the appropriate
state agency, and because another claim was actually litigated before the agency. Id. In rejecting
this analysis, the Eighth Circuit tacitly followed the reasoning in Elliot. A court need not apply the
Utah test if Congress intended a statute to partially repeal § 1738. Such a statute would prevent
administrative preclusion from obtaining in federal court. See infra notes 46-48.
10 843 F.2d at 281-82.
101 Id. at 280. The court cited Isbrandsten v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (statute codi-
l'ing common law to be read with a presumption of favoring long-established and familiar
principles)
102 X43 F.2d at 280-81.
103 Stv %upra note 29 and accompanying text.
104 843 F.2d at 282. "Prior to the adoption of the ADEA, preclusion was alive and well in the
federal common law and absent a clear showing of Congressional intent to the contrary it should
continue on. Such a showing has not been made in this case." Id.
105 Id. The malority declared that a comparison of ADEA with Title VII "does not address
the ultimate issue whether Congress intended to abrogate traditional rules of preclusion when it
enacted the ADEA." Id.
106 See infra note 10) and accompanying text.
107 See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
10S The court noted that Stillians had failed to show evidence of congressional intent to depart
from traditional rules of preclusion Instead, she understandably attempted to criticize the district
coui ',, tnalysis, Sece upra note 99. The district court, following the Duggan analysis (see infra notes
I 1-33 and accompanying text) found too many differences between ADEA and Title VII to permit
an infcrcnce that Congress intended to bar preclusive effect of state administrative proceedings in
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Circuit found that, unlike Title VII, ADEA contains no language incon-
sistent with traditional rules of preclusion. 09 The court reasoned that,
because an ADEA claimant may choose to forego state remedies and
pursue a discrimination claim in federal court,"' it would be anomalous
to permit the claimant to file suit anew in federal court after losing at the
state level."'
Having found no congressional intent to bar preclusion," 2 the Eighth
Circuit applied the second prong of the Elliot test." t3 The court con-
cluded that Stillians received a full and fair opportunity to litigate her
claims before the appropriate state agency." 4 Because the state agency
had served in a judicial capacity, the Eighth Circuit gave the agency's
determination preclusive effect and refused to decide the case on the
merits.115
b. Duggan v. Board of Education
In Duggan v. Board of Education,1"6 the Seventh Circuit held that
state administrative determinations have no preclusive effect in subse-
quent federal court suits with respect to ADEA claims." 7 To reach this
conclusion, the court relied heavily on both the language of ADEA and
the Supreme Court's analysis in Elliot." 8
The court in Duggan first queried whether a federal common-law rule
federal court. The Eighth Circuit expressly repudiated this type of analysis, however, and searched
for congressional intent independent of ADEA's legislative and historical ties to Title VII. 843 F.2d
at 281-82. The court also noted that there exists no federal policy favoring federal court review of
discrimination claims. Id. at 281. The court cited Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461
(1982) and Nichols v. City of St. Louis, 837 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1988) in support of its position. Id.
See supra notes 37, 80. Furthermore, the court contended that congressional intent, rather than
federal policy, dictated the Supreme Court's ruling in Elliot. 843 F.2d at 281.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (1982).
110. 843 F.2d at 281. A claimant may choose to initiate suit in either the state or federal system
60 days after filing a complaint with the appropriate state agency. 29 U.S.C. § 633.
111. 843 F.2d at 281. The court reasoned that it would be ludicrous to allow a petitioner to try
and possibly fail within the state system, but allow him a second chance at the federal level. The
court concluded that such a result would reduce the state administrative proceeding to a testing
ground for a petitioner to check the validity of his claim. Id. at 281-82.
112. Id. at 282.
113. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
114. The court applied Iowa law to determine whether the requirements for administrative issue
preclusion were satisfied. The court concluded that the requirements had been met. Id. at 283.
115. Id.
116. 818 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1987).
117. Id.
118. See supra notes 36-54 and accompanying text.
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of preclusion is consistent with Congress' intent in enacting ADEA. t t9
The Seventh Circuit considered whether Title VII and ADEA are suffi-
ciently alike to justify similar bars of administrative res judicata. 2 ° The
court began by comparing the statutes' respective deferral provisions.
Because of the parallels between ADEA's section 633121 and section 706
of Title VII, 22 the court construed the two statutes similarly with re-
spect to administrative preclusion.'
21
The deferral provisions of both statutes allow a claimant to bring suit
in several forums, after initiating the claim with the appropriate state or
federal agency. 124 The court reasoned that, although Congress initially
favored administrative treatment of discrimination claims, it did not in-
tend the judicial process to cease at the administrative level. 125 Given the
strong federal policy condemning employment discrimination, Congress
probably intended that federal courts review administrative discrimina-
tion determinations.' 26 In support of this theory, the court pointed to
the procedure of hearing Title VII claims in federal court.1 27
According to the Duggan court, the difference between the statutes'
respective deferral provisions further supports the proposition that ad-
ministrative preclusion should not obtain in ADEA suits.12 1 Under Title
VII, a claimant must wait sixty days after commencement of state agency
proceedings before filing suit with the EEOC or in federal court. 129 The
110 818 F.2d at 1294. The Supreme Court handed down Elliot after the district court had
rejected Duggan's ADEA claim (based on issue preclusion), but before the Seventh Circuit had
heard the appeal. In Duggan, the Seventh Circuit addressed the question whether Congress intended
to bar res judicata of ADEA claims brought in federal court after the appropriate state agency had
heard the claim and rendered a decision on the merits. Id. at 1293 n.7.
120. Id. at 1294.
121 See supra notes 13, 66.
122. Se supra notes 13, 66
123 818 F.2d at 1295. The court also explained that citizens of nondeferral states have an
advantage over citizens of deferral states. Section 633 dictates that a plaintiff in a deferral state must
first submit a claim to the appropriate state agency and wait 60 days before filing suit in federal
court. See supra note 8. Because § 633 does not encompass claims initiated by citizens of nondefer-
ral states, prior state agency findings do not impede these claims. 818 F.2d at 1295 n.10.
124, ,S'e, supra notes 13, 66.
125 818 F.2d at 1295. The court cited Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 478
(1081) as holding that "a prior state court judgment can deny an individual the right to a federal
trial de novo on his Title VII claim." 818 F.2d at 1295. See supra note 37.
126 818 F.2d at 1295. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
127 818 F.2d at 1295, citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See supra
note 17
128. Id. at 1206.
120 SeeL' supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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analogous ADEA deferral provision is less stringent. Under ADEA, a
claimant may file charges with the EEOC without first filing with the
appropriate state administrative body.130 Furthermore, no Title VII pro-
vision is analogous to section 633(a) of ADEA,1 3 1 which explicitly gives
federal suits priority over state suits. These distinctions suggest that fed-
eral claims are more central to Congress' ADEA scheme than to Title
VII's structure. This conclusion in turn weighs in favor of even less def-
erence to state administrative proceedings under ADEA.
From its statutory analysis, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Con-
gress intended to give less deference to ADEA state administrative find-
ings than to similar Title VII state administrative findings.' 32 The court
thus reasoned that, because the Supreme Court has not given Title VII
administrative findings preclusive effect in federal court, administrative




This Note proposes the adoption of the Duggan analysis' 3 4 and the
rejection of Stillians.135  In light of Elliot and the obvious parallels be-
tween Title VII and ADEA, unreviewed state agency determinations of
age discrimination claims should have no preclusive effect in subsequent
130. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
131. 818 F.2d at 1296. Section 633(a) provides that "upon commencement of an action under
this chapter, such action shall supersede state action." 29 U.S.C. § 633(a). See supra note 66.
132. 818 F.2d at 1297.
133. Id. In Duggan, the defendant school district argued that because the Supreme Court in
Elliot relied in part on Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982) (which provides that the
EEOC must accord "substantial weight" to state agency factfinding in subsequent EEOC suits), and
that because ADEA has no comparable provision, the court should not broaden Elliot's rationale to
encompass ADEA claims. Id. The court pointed out, however, that the Supreme Court's reliance
on § 706(b) in support of its conclusion in Elliot is not surprising. Section 706(b)'s language indi-
cates that administrative preclusion is inapplicable in Title VII claims. See supra notes 21-22 and
accompanying text. The absence of a provision in ADEA comparable to § 706(b) strengthens the
argument that state administrative factfinding has no preclusive effect in subsequent federal court
suits with respect to ADEA claims. Congress added § 706(b) to increase the EEOC's deference to
state administrative decisions in Title VII claims. Prior to 1972, the EEOC was under no statutory
obligation to defer to state administrative determinations. See supra note 12. The absence of a
similar provision in ADEA thus supports Duggan's contention that Congress intended to bar admin-
istrative preclusion in ADEA claims. See 818 F.2d at 1297.
134. See supra notes 116-33 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
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federal court suits. The Seventh Circuit's holding in Duggan thus repre-
sents an appropriate extension of Elliot.
In resolving the issue, a reviewing court must first ask whether Con-
gress intended administrative preclusion to obtain in ADEA claims
brought in federal court. 3 ' Although both the Stillians and Duggan
courts raised this question, only the Duggan court answered it cor-
rectly.' The Seventh Circuit in Duggan properly compared ADEA to
Title VII in its search for congressional intent. 38  The Eighth Circuit,
however, refused to make such a comparison.' 39
The Eighth Circuit's inquiry into congressional intent behind ADEA
is both incomplete and unsound. A reviewing court must construe
ADEA in light of its historical and legislative background.140  Not only
have courts frequently looked to Title VII for assistance in interpreting
analogous ADEA provisions, 14  but the Supreme Court expressly ap-
proved of this strategy.142 The Stillians court, however, rejected this ap-
proach, 43 citing no authority for its position.'" The Eighth Circuit
136 Sec Elliot, 478 U.S. at 791. See also supra notes 40, 55 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 98-100, 119, 132 and accompanying text.
138. Sec supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
13) The court in Stillians found the Duggan analysis of "dubious validity" because the Fourth
Circuit defined its task as comparing Title VII and ADEA to find whether similar bars of state
administrative preclusion exist. Stillians, 818 F.2d at 1297. The Stillians court, however, failed to
cite authority supporting its proposition that statutory interpretation by analogy is intrinsically
inappropriate.
140 See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 67-68, 73 and accompanying text.
142. Oscar Mayer v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979). See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying
text.
143 843 F.2d at 281-82. Although the court asserted that statutory analysis by way of analogy
is improper, it proceeded to compare Title VII with ADEA to support its conclusion. Id. at 281-82.
Chief Judge Lay, in dissent, stated that 'It]he majority concludes without any supporting authority
that a comparison of the ADEA and Title VII is inappropriate. Yet the majority opinion proceeds
to make just such a comparison immediately following that conclusion." Id. at 283-84 n.1 (Lay,
C J, dissenting). Specifically, the court first noted that ADEA must be examined independently for
expressions of congressional intent. Id. at 281 The court next declared that the absence of a provi-
sion similar to Title VII § 706(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) "in the ADEA goes far toward resolving
the issue," Id. The court's conclusion contradicts its earlier refusal to interpret a statute by analogy.
144, Sec . upra note tII. In fact, the Supreme Court case of Oscar Mayer v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750
(1979) directly undermines the analysis in Stillians and supports Duggan's position. See supra notes
67-68 and accompanying text. In addition, by refusing to compare ADEA with Title VII, the
Eighth Circuit unwittingly departed from Elliot's precedent. In Elliot, the Supreme Court com-
pared § 1983 and Title VII to determine whether similar preclusive characteristics existed. See supra
notes 44-46 and accompanying text. Although the Supreme Court did not hold that statutes compa-
rable to Title VII have comparable preclusive effect, it implicitly approved statutory analysis by way
of analogy.
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isolated ADEA and drew independent conclusions based solely on the
statute's language. The court thus performed merely a perfunctory lin-
guistic analysis, ignoring a historical examination.
The Eighth Circuit's construction of ADEA's language is also mis-
placed. Section 633(b) requires a petitioner to file a complaint with the
appropriate state agency at least sixty days before filing suit in federal
court. 14 - The Stillians court reasoned that, because an ADEA claimant
may bypass state remedies after sixty days, she has "the discretion to
forego state remedies in favor of a federal lawsuit." 4 6 Initially, however,
the claimant has no choice. Section 633(b) forces her to wait sixty days
before filing a federal claim. A claimant thus has no real "choice" until
the sixty-day time limit expires. 147 This restriction greatly undermines
the court's assertion that giving claimants a "choice" reduces state agen-
cies to mere testing grounds for future federal court suits., 41
The court in Stillians further erred by refusing to look to Title VII for
assistance in evaluating ADEA. Although ADEA legislative history is
silent with regard to whether administrative adjudications of ADEA
claims have preclusive effect in federal court,'49 this silence does not end
the inquiry. Title VII and ADEA both represent congressional concern
for discrimination in the workplace. 15  Title VII combats discrimination
on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex, 5 ' while
ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.' 5 2 Intuitively, one
can assume that Congress intended analogous provisions in the respec-
tive statutes to yield similar interpretations. This proposition is particu-
larly true in light of the fact that Title VII engendered the enactment of
the ADEA.'5 3 Having debated various controversies in the enactment of
Title VII and its amendments, Congress found it unnecessary to recon-
sider these issues when enacting ADEA and its amendments. Congres-
sional desire to avoid repetitious debates sufficiently explains the lack of
ADEA legislative history on the administrative res judicata issue.15 4
145. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
146. Stillians, 843 F.2d at 282. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 66, 124 and accompanying text.
148. Stillians, 843 F.2d at 282.
149. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 1-4, 12-17, 57-60 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 59-60, 65.
153. See Title VII § 715, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1982); DEP'T or LABOR RrP., supra note 1.
154. See Rosenfeld v. Department of the Army, 769 F.2d 237 (4th Cir. 1985); Nabors v. United
States, 568 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1978); supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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Arguably, the enactment of a separate statute to deal with age discrim-
ination is indicative of congressional intent to distinguish Title VII and
ADEA. However, the differences between the respective federal-state re-
lationship provisions reveal that federal courts actually must give less
deference to state agency determinations in ADEA claims than in Title
VII claims. t5" Congress apparently attached greater significance to fed-
eral judicial resolution of age discrimination claims than to the similar
resolution of Title VII claims. Because Elliot held that Title VII admin-
istrative adjudication has no preclusive effect in federal court,1 56 the ad-
judication of age discrimination claims merits the same treatment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit in Duggan performed an exhaustive study of the
comparable deferral provisions in ADEA and Title VII. The court's
analysis is sound and complete. Both the language of ADEA and its
obvious parallels to Title VII indicate the need to broaden Elliot's ration-
ale to encompass ADEA claims. The Duggan court, recognizing these
inherent similarities between the two statutes, appropriately held that un-
reviewed state administrative determinations of age discrimination
claims have no preclusive effect in subsequent federal court suits.
Clifford R. Perry III
155 Duggan. 818 F.2d at 1296 See supra text following note 131; supra note 132 and accompa-
nying text.
156. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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